K.D.D.D.D.Soc
Paul Walsh
If he can get him to improve as much as he has with Dembele I would be over the moon
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Tactics Thread
- Thread starter diego_maradona
- Start date
If he can get him to improve as much as he has with Dembele I would be over the moon
Bedfordspurs
Martin Peters
Dembele just looks fitter and sharper to me
He played like this last year in our best games like Chelsea, arsenal, west brim and Everton
parklane1
Vic Buckingham
Well we will have to agree to disagree, none of our players are without "cracks" in their game, however his goals and assists ( second only to Lamela last season I believe) are worthy of a place as a important member of our squad.
LutonSpurs
Eric Dear
One noteable difference in our tactics this season has been the play between the players when we have the ball in the defensive third. It is very very safe. There are very rarely any risky passes since the Bentaleb one against Utd. It seems Poch has made it very clear that we do not lose the ball in defense when we are high up the pitch. Verts and Toby have no hesitation passing back to LLoris and are happy to hoof it if need be. It's not the pretty stuff but it is damn beautiful for me to see my team not taking risks in that area.
K.D.D.D.D.Soc
Paul Walsh
We are making far less unforced errors (ignoring Sunday) and stopped giving the ball away so much.
Yes, plus we drop back when we don't recover the ball within a certain period of time.
The noticeable difference for me is how much less of our CB's being left 1:1 or 2:1 to opposition attacking players, something that was common last season with both our FB's overcommitting and the midfield not providing enough cover, we would lose the ball, be countered with ball over top to runner and 1:1 situation leaving CB exposed.
Kandi1977
Terry Dyson
It's a little more complex than that. Our pressing in the opposition half has improved also. Last year we got caught out on several occasions because the press wasn't good enough or simultaneous enough, allowing the opposition time to ping it up, especially crossing it, forcing the closest CB to move out wide in a one on one, and at the same time leaving a huge space in the middle. Now our initial press is so quick and they don't get the time on the ball to make those passes. This gives our FB's and CM time to get back in position.
parklane1
Vic Buckingham
Bingo and it was clear that was the main problem, thankfully Pooch could see it too.
braineclipse
Willie Hall
If not for the fact that gegenpressing was invented in October this year when Klopp moved to Liverpool I would have used that word to describe our play.
Agree fully that our pressing is a huge part of it. Look no further than how exposed we all of a sudden looked against Anderlecht away for example when our pressing was no longer spot on.
The players have made huge improvements on this from last season - when I thought our pressing looked alright at times, but faded too much as the season wore on.
Little Luka
John Scales
http://outsideoftheboot.com/2016/01...-1-leicester-city-foxes-continue-ti-surprise/
Comprehensive analysis of the loss to Leicester by Luke Balls-Burgess. You can follow him here: https://twitter.com/LukeBBurgess
I edited out a few bits (due to post size rules), so read the whole thing via the link above.
Comprehensive analysis of the loss to Leicester by Luke Balls-Burgess. You can follow him here: https://twitter.com/LukeBBurgess
I edited out a few bits (due to post size rules), so read the whole thing via the link above.
By Luke Balls-Burgess on January 17, 2016@LukeBBurgess
A top of the table six-pointer took place at White Hart Lane between top four hopefuls Spurs and Leicester only a matter of days after the two sides had played each other in the same fixture in the FA Cup. The two most difficult sides to beat this season in the Premier League clashed in what nearly the whole footballing world knew would be a tight affair, one that was unlikely to be decided by more than a goal or two.
Eriksen’s new role in Spurs’ 1-4-3-2-1
Issues in possession of the ball at the start of the season haunted Spurs, preventing them from turning many of those early draws into vital wins. Two of the main issues occurred after Spurs broke the opposition’s first line of pressure, slow circulation of the ball between midfield and the fullbacks often allowed the opposition to recover a solid defensive shape. This resulted in Spurs’ playmakers receiving the ball in congested areas with limited passing options, thus preventing Spurs from penetrating opposition defences from central areas with any regularity. A by-product of all this was that Harry Kane was often forced to drift deeper in search of the ball, often making life easier for the opposition defence.
Over the Christmas period, Pochettino made various slight tactical tweaks to his favoured 1-4-2-3-1 formation, usually revolving around the positioning of Cristian Eriksen and the advanced midfield ‘3’. Memories of the 4-1 thrashing of West Ham illustrated Eriksen’s deeper movement, seeing him drop deep into the left half-space in order to enjoy easier access to the ball with more time and more space. Developing on from this, against Leicester, Eriksen would drop very deep centrally, alongside Spurs double pivot of Tom Carroll and Eric Dier, thus prompting the change to a 1-4-3-2-1 shape for Spurs with Alli and Lamela in close support behind Kane up top.
Above we can see how Eriksen’s deeper positioning impacted Leicester’s defensive shape. Eriksen has often shown a great deal of positional intelligence when he plays, often positioning himself in provocative situations in between three or four opposition players. In this instance, Eriksen’s position is occupying four Leicester City players and because of how deep he is whilst occupying Leicester’s central midfield (Drinkwater and Kante) this opens up a large amount of space in between Leicester’s defensive and midfield lines. This often created passing opportunities into the feet of Spurs’ attackers (Alli, Lamela and Kane). This also removes some of the playmaking responsibility from the likes of Carroll and Dier, both inexperienced players who benefit from having an easier route into Eriksen’s feet (especially considering Dier’s technical inefficiencies).
The above image also illustrates Leicester’s narrow defensive shape, opening up a great deal of space for Walker on the right flank which could potentially have been exploited.
Elements of Juego de Posicion in Spurs play
Spurs have shown under Mauricio Pochettino how well they can regularly by-pass the opposition’s first line of defensive pressure by conditioning their opponents into a more open 1-4-4-2 defensive shape thanks to the movement of their fullbacks and midfield pivot. Known as ‘La Salida Lavolpiana’, Spurs often used either one of Dier or Carroll to drop in between or outside the centre back partnership of Vertonghen and Alderweireld in order to outnumber the Leicester front line of Vardy and Okazaki in order to circulate the ball past the Leicester frontline with more ease. The movement of Carroll and Dier opened up space in the centre for Eriksen to drop into and enjoy his new deeper role. This also allowed Spurs’ fullbacks to enjoy a greater influence on the game, although it was clear looking at Leicester’s defensive shape that they encouraged Spurs to pass wide rather than through the centre.
The above image illustrates how Carroll has moved deeper, in between Alderweireld and Vertonghen in order to outnumber Vardy and Okazaki two vs one, creating space in the centre for Eriksen. This also illustrates Leicester’s defensive shape/issues as Mahrez steps too far inside allowing Vertonghen to feed Davies far up the pitch.
Another development in Spurs’ play when entering the oppositions final third has seen a concentrated effort from the team to occupy the five vertical channels of the pitch in order to stretch and pin back the oppositions defensive shape. Dier’s disciplined role has rarely seen him advance up the pitch with the rest of the midfield as Spurs enter the oppositions final third, this allows Davies and Walker to occupy the two flanks higher up the pitch offering a potential wider route into the space behind Leicester’s defensive line.
Due to Mahrez and Albrighton stepping infield in order to maintain a very narrow and horizontally compact shape for Leicester, if Spurs were capable of by-passing the Leicester midfield line quick enough (like they did in the image above) this left huge gaps outside Leicester’s fullbacks which could’ve been exploited had Spurs recognised these opportunities.
Pinning Leicester’s backline back in this way also created space higher up the pitch for Eriksen who was now joining attacks later on due to his deeper starting position. This allowed Eriksen to offer himself as a cutback option in order to create a shooting opportunity on goal or as a pivot in order to quickly transition the ball from one flank to another higher up the pitch. Eriksen found it easier to find space higher up the pitch from this deeper starting position as he was now behind the play during such moves, meaning as Leicester’s midfield line made their recovery runs they wouldn’t be looking at Eriksen as he would now be behind them, allowing him to make blindside movements and free himself of any specific man-markers.
As we can see, Mahrez and Kante are forced to turn their backs on Eriksen as they make their recovery runs, thanks to Leicester’s narrow defensive shape opening up space down their flanks.
Spurs 1-4-3-2-1 can also be highlighted by looking at Spurs’ passing map, showing how regularly Spurs’ central midfielder’s and fullbacks accessed the ball also illuminating on Lamela’s and Alli’s aggressive roles.
Leicester’s Offense
Against such a possession hungry Spurs, Leicester showed throughout the game they were happy to try and absorb the Spurs pressure whilst protecting the vital central areas of the pitch. With the likes of Vardy, Albrighton, Mahrez and Kante offering blistering pace on the counter attack, Leicester allowed Spurs a way up the pitch which (in theory) wouldn’t threaten their goal too much if they were able to limit Spurs to crossing the ball. This would create large amounts of space behind Spurs’ defensive line to be exposed by Leicester’s pace, forcing the Spurs defensive line into defending whilst on the recovery run and whilst facing their own goal.
Like with Eriksen, this would mean Spurs’ defensive line would struggle to cope with dealing with late Leicester attackers as if the initial Leicester counter wasn’t successful, then the likes of Mahrez, Drinkwater and Kante would arrive late in the Spurs final third attacking an unorganised and panicked defence.
Ulloa’s introduction merely enabled Leicester a faster route up the pitch offering himself for flick-ons to Leicester’s runners as well as enabling Leicester to disrupt Spurs defensive shape whilst competing over the second balls. Leicester’s high tempo and direct style of offence often created situations such as the one above in the 76th minute of the game. As the Spurs defensive shape has been disrupted by Albrighton’s run and cross to the by-line, the Spurs defence is now unorganised and many of Leicester’s attackers are unaccounted for and left with time and space inside Spurs’ penalty area. Mahrez’s run at the back post has not been tracked as he prepares to shoot, Drinkwater has time and space on the edge of the penalty area and nearly every Spurs defender has their back to Okazaki who has space six yards out from Spurs’ goal. The panic created by Leicester’s offence has caused this and creates situations like above where Alderweireld’s first instinct is to get on the goal line where he’ll keep every Leicester attacker onside and leave Okazaki unmarked. This lack of composure was matched however by Leicester’s offense who didn’t show off their technical qualities by finishing any of these chances which kept Spurs hopeful of another late and dramatic winner (a la Watford and nearly all of their 2014/15 season).
Little Luka
John Scales
More from the same Luke Balls-Burgess. This may have been posted before, but an analysis of Pochettino.
https://pretentioussite.wordpress.c...al-tactical-overview-review-analysis-profile/
This one is very long, so only posting the link.
https://pretentioussite.wordpress.c...al-tactical-overview-review-analysis-profile/
This one is very long, so only posting the link.
milo
Jack L. Jones
Thanks for sharing @Little Luka
Baleforce
Ron Henry
The problem is .. very simple game to understand .. nuances could take a lifetime.
Poch intrigues me, I really didn't believe it took a group of professional players 12 months to understand a system that isn't unique or in theory that difficult (outside of fitness).
Yet, I see a progression, initial finding of right first 11, changing tempo of game, starting press, add safety to press (drop back when you don't retrieve within timeframe), fluidity to front 4, smarter set pieces, expansion of 11 to include rotation players ... its taken months.
Never thought I was even amateur coach level understanding of game, but I could see what most managers setup to do, I really don't know where Poch goes next ...
parklane1
Vic Buckingham
And very true, armchair supporters rule right.
Interesting subset of an article on Cheat$ki re Mourinho -
In The Manager Barney Ronay essentially argues that the role was invented to insulate the board of directors from blame.
There is a growing body of thought that believes that the manager is not as significant as football has made him. In Why England Lose, for instance, Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski argue that, in the 10 years beginning in 1998, a club’s total wage spend accounted for 89% of the variation in its average position in the league table. In The Numbers Game Chris Anderson and David Sally consider the decade from 2001-02 to 2010-11 and conclude that the actual figure is 81% – that a manager accounts for, at most, 19% of where a team finishes in the league.
full article here -> http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/jan/21/chelsea-jose-mourinho-guus-hiddink-managers
If you believe that assumption, then not only is the manager less relevant, so are tactics .. back to the Harry view, but better players and let them do their thing ...
In The Manager Barney Ronay essentially argues that the role was invented to insulate the board of directors from blame.
There is a growing body of thought that believes that the manager is not as significant as football has made him. In Why England Lose, for instance, Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski argue that, in the 10 years beginning in 1998, a club’s total wage spend accounted for 89% of the variation in its average position in the league table. In The Numbers Game Chris Anderson and David Sally consider the decade from 2001-02 to 2010-11 and conclude that the actual figure is 81% – that a manager accounts for, at most, 19% of where a team finishes in the league.
full article here -> http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/jan/21/chelsea-jose-mourinho-guus-hiddink-managers
If you believe that assumption, then not only is the manager less relevant, so are tactics .. back to the Harry view, but better players and let them do their thing ...
braineclipse
Willie Hall
No doubt there has been real progress.
I believe part of the reason why it takes so long to "understand" or rather implement a system like this are all the other factors involved. Often players have two games a week, with work concentrating on the individual opponent, recovery work, physical fitness work, set piece work etc etc etc the time on the training ground working on "the system" is surely limited. The system will also have to be tweaked with changes to the side, new signings, injuries, drops in form etc.
We're also not talking about just understanding a system in theory. But rather to implement it with a real degree of consistency. A player can understand the theory of pressing without implementing often enough for it to be effective. Players have to learn to read the situations and do so in the high tempo environment of the PL, while also working on all the other aspects of the game. If you understand who you should play the next pass to it does you no good if you let your concentration slip and mess up the first touch. Getting to the level of consistency where a system like Pochettino's becomes truly effective and fairly consistent will always take time. Especially as it needs to be effective against a wide range of opponents.
Probably just about right. But that "11-19%" makes up a pretty big difference in terms of league finishes when you're just about bobbing around relegation or fighting for a CL spot or title.
The Redknapp view of getting players to do their thing will work. Often it will work better than a system that's not implemented successfully I believe. But a truly effective system well implemented will be better. And when trying to compete with those clubs with more money available to them I don't see a better way to approach things.
There's also a slight issue of direction of causality here I believe. United became a hell of a lot richer because of their success under Ferguson. Same story with Arsenal and Wenger. If a club is successful thanks to a good manager and then gets more money and then finishes higher up the table thanks to that money the analysis mentioned most likely attributes all of the influence of said improvement to the money factor. In reality there is a relationship between the manager's influence and the financial situation of the club that's much more interdependent than this analysis would indicate.
Finally I believe there's also a slight issue with the conclusion of how much of the variance is explained by the wages spent. Bigger clubs with more money are also able to attract better managers. In part simply because they also pay their managers more, in part because they offer a more attractive challenge to the managers. I don't think there's any way to isolate that from the kind of analysis being mentioned so the conclusion that a manager accounts for at most 19% of where a team finishes in the league doesn't actually follow from the observation that wage spend accounted for 81% of league finishes.
All imo (and yes I understand that you're not arguing for a return of the mighty Redknapp).
mudshark
Chris Armstrong
Success breeds success, but you don't just put a simple formula in place, rinse and repeat, because the dynamic always evolves. What works at the moment at a given club won't necessarily achieve the same results next season (I don't have to tell you that, Jose). Players are human beings. They get jaded. They get bored hearing the same sermons again and again. What used to motivate them to give 100% doesn't necessarily motivate them any more. Personalities come into it. Ambitions change.
Pochettino probably has close to an optimum situation at the moment, with a squad full of young, malleable players who like him, buy into his ideas and, importantly, are also able to deliver performances at a high level. His influence in these circumstances is likely to be a lot more significant than it would be, were he managing a side with more mature, perhaps not so hungry players. Worth more than 19 or 20 per cent, arguably. One thing we can be sure of, though, is that things don't stay the same indefinitely. The value of your investment may go down as well as up. Enjoy it while it lasts.
Crossing in general is not an efficient way to attack, but is a useful variation -- more so in pressure situations, where defenders are more likely to make a mistake. How many big finals have been decided by defenders who cracked under the pressure of last gasp crosses or punts into the box? I bet if you go back through some Champions League finals, you'll find key goals scored from crosses (or a messed up clearance from a cross). Regular games, not so much.