They have some 10,000 artillery guns pointed at Seoul, which is extremely close to the border. These guns, as a USPACOM report I read a couple of years ago explained, are maintained with comparatively more resources than most of the other under-equipped divisions of the KPA Ground Force. They are also well within continuous barrage range of the city.
Admittedly, a barrage from these guns wouldn't flatten the South Korean capital, but would cause at the very least civilian casualties running into five figures. After that, the North's tactic would be to fight a defensive war, breaking up their many, many infantry and armoured divisions into small independent units capable of staging guerilla and localized warfare against advancing US and South Korean forces.
Sorry if that all sounds like military-speak, I did an analysis on the probability of a Korean war a couple of years ago and language like that tends to stick. Basically, NK's strategy in a war would be to first pre-emptively bombard Seoul, causing large damage to the South Korean capital and winning a significant morale victory. Then, they would withdraw into the easily defensible North Korean mountain ranges that criss-cross seventy percent of the country and fight attritional battles using large numbers of independent small units against the retaliating masses of US and South Korean forces, which would be more centralized and thus more vulnerable to attack. This would also negate the huge advantages offered by US air cover, as mountain ranges are very difficult to effectively bomb. This way, the North Koreans would then force the US to bow out of the war after taking sufficiently high numbers of casualties (10,000 +, easily achievable given the circumstances above) and proceed to overwhelm South Korea's now isolated armies through sheer numbers.
That's their most sensible strategy. Using their nukes would probably only happen as a last resort, i.e when Pyongyang itself is threatened or when the conventional war is lost. They're crazy, but they're not stupid: using their nukes is a gold-plated opportunity for America to retaliate without restraint, and considering that they have no way of reaching the mainland United States (given their most recent test attempt splashed into the Sea of Japan), they would probably consider that a step too far.
On the flip side South Korea must be aware of all the above and have their own contingency plans?
Thanks,
...more interesting than anything I'll learn at work today
They've practised country-wide evacuations, Seoul-specific ones the priority. 2010 was the last one, I believe. However, only 11 million of SK's 49 million strong population took part in the last one, and in Seoul the focus turned from evacuation to bunkering down pretty quickly, with civilians being instructed to get to bunkers and safe points instead, as an evacuation (simulated or otherwise) was quickly deemed near-impossible given the bottleneck-state of the main roads leading out of the capital towards the southern part of the peninsula. So, in the sense of preventing civilian casualties in and around Seoul, I get the sense the South hasn't prepared as well as it could have.
Militarily, they are in a better position. The South's original strategy was based on the assumption that North Korea would follow their earlier strategic doctrine, namely massed chemical, artillery and conventional attacks along the length of the frontline followed by thrusts towards Seoul and Inchon. Therefore, the South`s plan was to maintain a defensive posture and use deep strike and naval-borne attack units (given SK's considerable naval superiority) to cut North Korean supply lines and seize Wonsan and Haeju, creating an 'encircling' effect and allowing for a pincer movement to destroy the bulk of NK forces advancing beyond the DMZ. With the reported new tactical approach by the North, therefore, the South is afforded a unique opportunity: stick to the old system and thus frustrate North Korean battle plans. In the event of an attack on Seoul, therefore, the South`s most viable plan seems to be to stay put along the DMZ, while enacting a naval blockade against North Korea and using U.S and South Korean air power to pound north Korean command positions and strategically important population centres. Driven by enemy action, the North would be forced to either launch a head on assault against entrenched SK and US positions (suicide, given the South's technological and material superiority) or face civilian insurrection from a disgruntled Northern populace. Possibly both.
However, this strategy risks further loss of civilian life from NK bombardment from its artillery positions along the DMZ and its well-fortified missile bases in the mountains behind it. There`s no easy answers for the South: their position is such that a large loss of South Korean lives is almost inevitable, whatever strategy they adopt. Their choice is whether to make it military losses (via doing what NK expects it to do) and also risk defeat, or make it high civilian losses but with a far greater chance of assured success.
My concern is a pre-emptive strike by the U.S therefore angering the Chinese and Russians in return and escalating things way beyond Ban Ki-Moon's capabilities
My concern is a pre-emptive strike by the U.S therefore angering the Chinese and Russians in return and escalating things way beyond Ban Ki-Moon's capabilities
All right Col. Powell great read mate.